编者：一位年轻人对一家地方报纸说，我不想再像父亲一样在城里吃苦。凭借父母几十年在城里打拼攒下的钱，他们家在农村修了宽敞的房子，买了不少家电，生活很不错……

　　Various domestic media reports put the labor supply gap at around a million people in Guangzhou and neighboring cities such as Dongguan, legendary centers of China's export boom in the past three decades. Numerous assembly lines and construction sites are sitting idle while anxious employers have raised salaries by more than 30% but still can't attract enough applicants.

　　多家国内媒体报道称，广州及邻近的东莞等城市的农民工缺口大约在100万人，这些地方在过去三十年中一直号称中国出口热潮的中心所在。无数生产线闲置、建筑工地停工，焦急不已的用工方已将工资提高了30%以上，却仍然无法吸引足够的求职者。

　　So where have all the theoretically jobless peasants gone?

　　那么，那些理论上没有工作的农民都去哪儿了?

　　Structural unemployment - a mismatch between the skills workers have and those sought by employers - doesn't fully explain the phenomenon. To answer the question, one needs to consider a combination of factors that symbolize the changing landscape of China's labor force and modern society in general.

　　结构性失业──即劳动者技能与用工方要求不匹配──并不能完全解释这种现象。要回答这个问题，就得考虑多种因素，它们代表了不断变化的中国劳动力状况以及整体上的现代社会。

　　Firstly, there is indeed a structural problem here and it's twofold: On the one hand, many of the outstanding job vacancies are due to a lack of skilled workers as segments of China's export industry crawl up the value chain; but on the other hand, some factories complain that lots of the new-generation migrant workers aren't interested in tough basic jobs like construction any more.

　　首先，结构性问题确实存在，而且它是双重的：一方面，很多尚未填补的职位空缺缘于中国出口行业在价值链中攀升的过程中技术工人的缺乏;另一方面，一些工厂抱怨很多新生代农民工不再有兴趣从事建筑等艰苦的基础性工作。

　　The lack of interest in such low-paying, physically demanding work partly stems from the second factor - the growing income at home for these farmers. Much to its credit, the Chinese government has consistently put developing agriculture and feeding the rural population (which measured 727.5 million in 2007) as its top priority over the years. An incessant stream of favorable policies, such as scrapping burdensome taxes and forceful market intervention, have increased rural incomes to the extent that farming is becoming more rewarding than cleaning skyscraper windows in some places.

　　农民工对于这类低薪重体力工作缺乏兴趣一部分又是源自第二个因素──他们在家乡的收入有所增长。值得称许的是，中国政府多年来一直将发展农业、解决农村人口温饱问题(2007年农村人口达7.275亿)作为首要工作重点。取消农业税、加大市场干预等源源不断的惠农政策令农村收入增加，在一些地方，务农已经比清洁摩天大楼窗户赚得更多了。

　　China's little-noticed reform to allow large state enterprises to rent farmland from peasants in order to modernize farming and boost productivity has started reaping fruits and also created a burgeoning group of idle farmers who can afford to live on their handsome rental income.

　　中国进行了一项不引人注目的改革，允许大型国有企业从农民手中租赁土地，以实现农业现代化、提高生产率，这项改革已经开始取得成果，也催生了一批新兴的闲散农民，他们单靠出租土地的收入就足以维持生活了。

　　Thirdly, the current labor shortage in affluent coastal regions such as the Yangtze and Pearl River deltas is partly due to the construction boom and fast economic growth in second-tier inland cities such as Chongqing, Wuhan and Nanchang. Many migrant workers prefer these places because salaries are in some cases almost on par with Shanghai's and it's simply closer to home.

　　第三，长三角和珠三角等富裕沿海地区当前用工荒的部分原因在于，重庆、武汉、南昌等二线内陆城市的建筑热和快速经济增长。许多农民工更愿意去这些地方，因为那儿的薪水有时差不多向上海看齐，而且离家更近。

　　Lastly, a fairly qualitative but nonetheless significant observation is that just like in China's urban areas, the young generation of the rural population seems to have taken on a different world view. While their parents - migrant workers in their late 40s or early 50s - are gradually returning home and fading from the scene, their children who have been raised in relatively good conditions, are under much less pressure to support themselves or their (smaller) families.

　　最后，还有一个决定性的重要现象是，跟中国城市地区一样，农村地区的年轻一代似乎也有着不同的世界观。在这一代人的父母──50岁上下的一代农民工──逐渐回到家乡，淡出人们的视线时，在相对较好的条件下长大的年轻一代养活自己或支撑(规模更小的)家庭的压力要小得多。